Abstract. Recent works on political competition incorporate a valence dimension into the standard spatial model. The analysis of the game between candidates in these models is typically based on two assumptions about voters' preferences. One is that valence scores enter the utility function of a voter in an 'additively separable' way, so that the total utility can be decomposed into the 'ideological utility' from the implemented policy (based on the Euclidean distance) plus the valence of the winner. The second is that all the voters identically perceive the platforms of the candidates and agree about their score on the valence dimension.
Introduction
Since the seminal works of Hotelling [21] and Downs [14] , spatial models of elections are widely used in the political economy literature. Typically, these models identify the policy space with a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Each potential voter in the electorate is assumed to have an ideal point in the policy space, and his utility if a certain policy is implemented is decreasing in the Euclidean distance between this policy and his ideal point. Candidates then choose their platforms and each voter votes for the candidate with the closest platform to her ideal policy. Usually, the emphasis is on equilibrium analysis of the resulting game between candidates.
More recently, researchers incorporated a "valence" dimension to the standard model. This additional dimension influence voters' preferences and was shown to have an important effect on the outcome of the political game, both in theory and in empirical studies. This additional dimension may represent any non-policy issue on which candidates differ in the "score" they get from voters. Examples include charisma, experience, past success, communication skills, etc. The difference between the valence dimension and other dimensions (which are part of the policy space) is that all voters prefer high valence scores to low. References to works that incorporate valence issues can be found in the related literature section below.
Let C denote the set of candidates competing in some elections, and let the d dimensional Euclidean space R d represent the policy space. When valence issues are present, the preferences of voters are defined over the set R d × C. Indeed, the utility of a potential voter depends both on the implemented policy and on the valence of the winning candidate. Notice that we deal with a collection of preference orders, one for each voter.
In almost all the works that we are aware of, the analysis is based on two fundamental assumptions about this collection of preferences, which we now discuss.
The first assumption concerns the preferences of individual voters. The utility function of a voter is assumed to be 'additively separable' in the policy and valence dimensions.
That is, each voter has an 'ideological' utility function over policies and a valence index for candidates. The utility of a voter from a pair (x, i) ∈ R The second key assumption usually made is that all the voters perceive in the same way the alternatives they face. First, the voters agree on the location of the candidates in the policy space. That is, the beliefs of all voters regarding the policy that a certain candidate is going to implement if elected coincide. Although this seems like a rather strong assumption, it can be justified by the claim that candidates commit to a certain policy prior to the elections, and so this is the policy that voters anticipate will be implemented if the candidate is elected. But voters are also supposed to agree about the valence of each candidate. This is harder to justify, in particular since it seems reasonable that voters with different ideological views will also have different views of the valence of candidates. Notice that, if one allows to each potential voter to perceive the platforms and/or valences of the candidates differently, then the model may become completely untractable.
Obviously, it is very hard (not to say impossible) to extract the entire preferences of each voter over pairs of a winning candidate and an implemented policy. Therefore, it is not easy to check whether the aforementioned assumptions make sense in any particular political campaign. Thus, it seems an important matter to identify conditions on more easily observable data that guarantee consistency with the spatial model assumptions.
Introducing such necessary and sufficient conditions is the main result of this paper.
Specifically, we assume that, for each potential voter in the electorate, only his ideal policy and his ranking of the candidates can be observed. While this may also seem quite demanding, it is much more reasonable than observing the entire utility function of the voter. We characterize the case where this data is consistent with voters having utility functions as above. That is, we characterize the case where there are platforms
and numbers {v i } i∈C representing valence scores, such that a voter with an ideal policy y ranks the candidates according to v i − ||x i − y|| 2 . We emphasize that the representation is for the collection of preference orders of all voters jointly, and not for the preferences of a single voter.
We use four conditions for the characterization. The first is that each voter preferences over candidates are rational (complete and transitive). The second is a continuity condition. The third and perhaps most important condition is convexity of the set of voters 1 Notice that we take the square of the Euclidean norm (and not just the norm) as the 'ideological' utility function. We discuss this point in subsection 3.3.
preferring one candidate over another. There is a close connection between convexity and the Euclidean metric, as other metrics would typically induce non-convex sets. The last condition requires sufficient heterogeneity in the preferences. This is a more technical condition which is not necessary for the representation but is required for the sufficiency part of the proof. 2 We think of our result as "good news" since it shows that if voters' preferences satisfy a set of rather natural axioms then they are consistent with the standard spatial model with a valence dimension.
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From a theoretical viewpoint, the result provides a possible justification for the assumptions (discussed above) that allow to study the game between candidates. From an empirical perspective, the axioms may help to check whether the spatial model makes sense in any particular campaign. Bogomolnaia and Laslier [8] find the exact number of dimensions required in order to be able to represent any preference profile of I voters over A alternatives. Knoblauch [24] provides a polynomial time algorithm to check whether a given finite preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation.
There are also several works that study similar questions for a more general class of preferences that include Euclidean preferences as a special case. Eguia [15] axiomatizes preference relations over lotteries over multi-attribute objects that admit a representation by some l p norm. He also studies the case of multiple voters and characterize the case where their preferences can be jointly represented by such a norm. Kalandrakis [22] considers the case where a finite number of binary choices is observed, and characterizes the case where these choices can be rationalized by a concave utility function. He further studies the case where the rationalizing function has a bliss point.
2 Nevertheless, our main result (Theorem 1) is an equivalence theorem. See Section 2 for details. 3 Our conditions are not sufficient if one doesn't allow for a valence dimension, and we do not know how to characterize data consistent with spatial models without this additive term. See subsection 3.3.
4 Some of their results generalize to the case where candidates get different valence scores from voters.
See Section 3.2 in [12] .
An important difference between our paper and all of the above is that we assume that, for any point in the policy space, the preferences of a voter with this ideal point over candidates are observed. All of the above papers deal with either a single preference relation or with a finite number of relations. While observing the preferences of a continuum of voters is impossible, we note that many previous works assume a continuous distribution of voters' ideal points. We further discuss this point in subsection 3.1.
Papers using spatial models of elections with valence issues similar to the one studied here are numerous in recent years. From a technical point of view, our main result is closely related to Theorem 1 in Azrieli and Lehrer [7] , who characterize categorization systems that are generated by proximity to a set of prototypical cases. Furthermore, there is a surprisingly close connection between the result of this paper and the characterization of a collection of preference orders that can be represented by linear functionals.
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Such characterizations appear in works on scoring rules (Myerson [26] , Smith [28] , Young [29] ), case-based decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler [18] ), expected utility in the context of games (Gilboa and Schmeidler [19] ), relative utility (Ashkenazi and Lehrer [5] ) and individual welfare functionals (Chambers and Hayashi [10] ).
Finally, the mathematical object we deal with here is known in the geometry literature as (generalized) Voronoi diagram or (generalized) Dirichlet tessellation.
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The most relevant papers in this literature are Ash and Bolker [3] , [4] and Aurenhammer [6] . The book by Boots et al. [9] surveys applications of Voronoi diagrams in many different fields.
1.2.
Organization. The next section contains the model and the main result of the paper, as well as a result regarding the uniqueness of the representation. In Section 3 we discuss several issues related to the model. In particular, we study the case of a finite set of voters, discuss the importance of the valence dimension for the result, and consider 5 We thank Itzhak Gilboa for pointing out this connection. 6 The word 'generalized' is added to indicate that there is an additive constant associated with each candidate. These objects are also called power diagrams in some places in the geometry literature. Our primitive is a collection of binary relations { y } y∈R d over C, one for every voter
The interpretation of i y j is that a voter with an ideal point y (weakly) prefers candidate i to candidate j. As usual, for any i, j ∈ C, we let i y j if and only if both i y j and j y i, and i ∼ y j if and only if both i y j and j y i.
Axioms.
The following properties will be used for the characterization. (A4) Heterogeneity: For every three distinct candidates {i, j, k} ⊆ C there is y ∈ R d such that i y j y k, and for every four distinct candidates {i, j, k, l} ⊆ C the sets
The first property is standard. The second implies that if a voter with ideal point y strictly prefers candidate i over j then any voter with ideal point sufficiently close to y also prefers i over j. (A3) states that the set of voters preferring candidate i over j is convex. Finally, (A4) requires the population of voters to be sufficiently diverse in its preferences. Namely, for any (strict) ranking of every three candidates there should be a voter who ranks these candidates according to that given order; and for every three candidates there should be a voter that is indifferent between them but is not indifferent between them and some given fourth candidate. Note that if m = 2 then (A4) is trivially satisfied, and if m = 3 then the second part of (A4) is trivially satisfied. 7 Our result does not hold in the case d = 1. We elaborate on this case in subsection 3.6.
Main result.
Before stating our result we need one more definition.
is in a general position if the following two conditions hold:
Informally speaking, if a set of points is not in a general position then it has a 'degenerate structure'. We remark that if the points {(
independently drawn from some continuous distribution over R (ii) There are points
in a general position and, for every i, j ∈ C and every
The point 
represent the prefer- such that x i = αx i + β for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and such that the equation
holds for every i, j ∈ C. In particular, if
This result can be interpreted as follows. We may rescale and change the origin of the policy space to get different sets of platforms that induce the same preferences.
But once the unit of measurement and the origin are fixed the platforms are uniquely determined by the preferences. Moreover, once platforms are fixed, the relative valences of the various candidates (the differences v i − v j ) are also unique. Figure 1 illustrates the location of the voters' ideal points in the policy space and their rankings.
It is easy to check that the above condition of disjointness of the convex hulls is satisfied. However, we claim that these preferences are not consistent with a spatial model. Indeed, assume to the contrary that there are {(x 1 , v 1 ), (x 2 , v 2 ), (x 3 , v 3 )} that represent these preferences as in Theorem 1. The locations of the points y 1 , y 2 , y 3 , y 4 and the preferences of these voters imply that the line {y ∈ R Now, for sufficiently small , it must be the case that the pointȳ = (1, −1) is in the triangle generated by these three lines. It means that at this point we must have Using the square of the norm is natural also due to the following reason. We would like to think of the valence dimension as equally important to the policy dimensions.
Recall that we think of the valence dimension as a dimension on which all voters agree that more is better. An alternative way to put this is to say that the ideal point of every voter is +∞ along this dimension. For the sake of the argument, assume that we replace (B2) For every i ∈ C and y, z ∈ R, if i ∈ f (y) ({i} = f (y)) and i ∈ f (z) then
Before stating the result, we need a definition analogue to Definition 1.
is well-ordered if there is a permutation π : C → C such that the following two conditions hold:
Proposition 3. The correspondence f : R → 2
C satisfies properties (B1) and (B2) if and only if there is a well-ordered set
4. Proofs 4.1. Proof of Theorem 1. The proof of Theorem 1 is similar to the proof of the main result in Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) . We therefore provide an outline of the proof and only detail those steps that did not appear in that paper.
A simple but important observation is that, for any
} is an affine subspace of dimension d − 1 (a hyperplane), perpendicular to the direction x i − x j . Indeed, a simple computation shows that this set can be rewritten as
Similarly, the set {y ∈ R
} is an open half space in
(ii) implies (i): 
(i) implies (ii):
The proof is constructive. We first find the platforms 
It is useful to note that α ij s ij = α 1j s 1j − α 1i s 1i for every 3 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Indeed, the left-hand side of the equality is x j − x i while the right-hand side is (
This implies also that α ij c ij = α 1j c 1j − α 1i c 1i . To see this, take y ∈ R To complete the proof we need to check that the set {(
is in a general position and that, for every i, j ∈ C and y ∈ R d , i y j if and only if
. For the latter we have
For the former, the vectors x i , x j , x k are affinely independent since x j − x i = α ij s ij and 
such that x i = αx i + β for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and in addition equation (1) is satisfied
represent the same preferences { y } y∈R d . It follows from the proof of Theorem 1 that for every i, j ∈ C there is a positive number, say t ij > 0, such that x j −x i = t ij (x j −x i ) (with the convention t ij = −t ji ). Fix some three candidates i, j, k ∈ C. Sum up the equalities
and rearrange the terms to obtain (
Finally, we must have
Substituting αx i + β for x i and αx j + β for x j and rearranging we obtain equation (1) . In particular, if (1,-1) Figure 1 
